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I. INTRODUCTION
The law strives to keep abreast of the problems created by scientific
advances in fields which affect human interaction. The practice of human
artificial insemination is such an area. To clarify the context in which
these problems arise, this article begins with a summary of the history
of artificial insemination, hereinafter referred to as AI, and a considera-
tion of its present status and probable future. The psychological and
sociological aspects of the practice are next discussed. The effect on the
marital relationship and other possible legal issues which exist under
Florida law are then presented. Finally, alternative legislative proposals
are evaluated, and a proposed artificial insemination statute for Florida
is presented.
Artificial insemination has been defined as "the deposition of semen
in the vagina, cervical canal, or uterus by means of instruments."' As
practiced among humans, a differentiation is made according to the
source of the semen which is used. If it is provided by the husband of
the woman inseminated, the procedure is designated AIH (Artificial
* B.S.B.A. Florida Atlantic University (1966). Mr. Wellens is a third year student at
the University of Miami School of Law. This comment was prepared for the Domestic Rela-
tions Workshop.
1. REPORT OF COMMISSION APPOINTED BY HIS GRACE THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY,
ARTIFICIAL HUMAN INSEMINATION 7 (1948).
COMMENTS
Insemination, Husband).2 Where the semen of a third party donor is
used, AID (Artificial Insemination, Donor)' is the term usually em-
ployed. The use of mixed husband and donor semen is sometimes referred
to as CAI (Combined Artificial Insemination).
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. History
Ancient Jewish literature indicates that man has known of artificial
insemination since the second century.4 However, the earliest efforts to
accomplish artificial insemination apparently were not made until early
in the 14th century, when Arabs fertilized horses in this manner.5 Dr.
John Hunter of England reported the artificial insemination of a wife
with the semen of her husband in the late 18th century.' In 1866, Dr. J.
Marion Sims, an American physician, effected a series of fifty-five in-
seminations with the husband's semen.7 Use of a donor's semen achieved
recognizable status with the work of Dr. Robert Dickinson commencing
in 1890.8 In 1907, the Russian physiologist, Iwanoff, published a work,
based upon extensive experimentation, which provided the basis for and
stressed the advantages of the large-scale use of artificial insemination
in animal husbandry.9
B. Present Status
Artificial insemination is now a technique capable of being performed
by any physician.10 Because an almost complete lack of data results from
the secrecy insisted upon by the parties to AI, reliance must be placed
on informed estimates. The number of individuals conceived through Al
and now living in the United States has been estimated to be up to
200,000." The growing importance of this procedure is demonstrated by
the fact that several sperm storage banks have been established in the
United States and Europe.'
2. Also referred to frequently as "homologous artificial insemination."
3. Also referred to frequently as "heterologous artificial insemination."
4. Kardimon, Artificial Insemination in the Talmud, 2 HEBREW MEn. J. 164 (1950).
5. J. SCHELLEN, ARTIFICIAL INSEmINATION IN THE HumAN 9 (1957).
6. Home, An Account of the Dissection of an Hermaphrodite Dog, 1 PHILOSOPHICAL
TRANSCRIPT ROYAL Soc'y 158 (1799). Home refers to the plight of a linen merchant who
consulted Doctor Hunter because he was unable to father a child due to hypospadias (a
deformity of the penis in which the uretha opens on its under surface).
7. J. SIMs, CLINICAL NOTES ON UTERINE SURGERY (1866).
8. Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 97 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Or Sci. 623 (1962).
9. Iwanoff, De la jecondation artificielle chez les mammijeres, 12 ARCHIVES OF SCI. &
BIOLOGY ST. PETERSBURG 7 (1907).
10. Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15
OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 767 (1960).
11. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare v. Koehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E.2d 587, 20 N.Y.S.2d
172 (1940).
12. See Levisohn, Dilemma In Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial
Insemination, 36 Cm-KENT L. REV. 3 (1959).
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One out of ten married couples in the United States cannot conceive
offspring in the usual manner. Moreover, even though reliable data is
not available on the proportion of childless marriages due to male sterility,
in forty percent of the reported cases of infertility the fault is the hus-
band's sterility. 4 AIH is medically indicated when the husband has live
spermatozoa of adequate motility, but for one of a number of possible
reasons cannot deposit them so that conception may occur. Principally
these are paraplegia (a paralysis resulting from an injury to the spinal
column) and hypospadias (the urethral opening occurring on the under-
side of the penis)." AID is medically indicated when there is a complete
absence of live spermatozoa and also when there is clinical sterility, as
with a poor sperm count, coupled with a long history of a failure to
conceive. AID is also indicated in some marriages for genetic reasons
such as a history of serious hereditary disease in the husband's family
and in some instances of Rh factor incompatibility between the wife and
the husband.'
C. Future of Artificial Insemination
An important indication of whether the practice of AI is likely to
increase is in the area of adoption. The two main reasons for turning to
AI are an inability or unwillingness to have a child normally and the
inability or unwillingness to utilize adoption procedures.' 7 All of the
reasons for an unwillingness to adopt cannot, of course, be known. Many
individuals dislike the often inquisitorial approach of the case worker.
The formalities and protracted proceedings are often disliked, as is the
probationary period during which the child may be taken away. Some
would rather not have the local publicity which usually attends an adop-
tion. AID is seen as a means of avoiding these undesirable aspects of
adoption and as offering positive attractions. Those most frequently
mentioned are that the wife's maternal urge is satisfied by actually bear-
ing the child, that the child's hereditary characteristics are the product
of the wife and a selected donor rather than of an unknown couple, and
that secrecy can be maintained. It is impossible to evaluate the impact
of adoption on the future of AID other than to state that the number of
couples who might use AID is reduced by the number who choose and
are permitted to use adoption instead.
If lack of knowledge is a major impediment to the spread of AID,
it will probably be surmounted only gradually. As public awareness
13. Warner, Problems and Treatment of the Infertile Couple, 57 MED. WOMEN's J. 13
(1950).
14. Warner, Artificial Insemination, 51 MED. WOMEN'S J. 17 (1944).
15. Warner, supra note 13, at 16 and 19.
16. Warner, Artificial Donor Inseminations (An Analysis of 100 Cases), 13 Hus.tA
FERTILITY 37 (1948).
17. The choice of artificial insemination also implies the rejection of three other alter-
natives not discussed here, i.e., divorce, continued childlessness, or extramarital intercourse.
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increases, however, the attitude of individual couples toward AID, as
shaped by prevailing public opinion, will become the most influential
factor in the future of AID. However, the fact that ten to fifteen percent
of all married couples are childless seems sufficient for the belief that
AID will eventually be practiced extensively.'
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
There is little direct evidence on the psychological aspects of AID.19
Doctors who practice AID emphasize the benefits provided by the
unique emotional experience of motherhood, together with the joy
invariably expressed by the couple when the child is born. Many couples
are said to demonstrate their continued satisfaction when they return
for additional AID children.2" The lack of litigation is seen by some as
proof that AID does not result in emotional disaster. Indeed, many
practitioners feel that the AID children often provide an indispensable
ingredient for a stable marital relationship. 21 It is believed that through
intimate association the familial relationships develop just as they would
if the child were conceived normally. The lack of a biological relation
between the husband and child is regarded as insignificant.2
The psychological aspects of AI can be affected by religious influ-
ences. Of the major religions, AI has received disapproval only from the
Catholic Church,2" while the general Jewish 24 and Protestant 25 position
is to consider AI as an individual matter resting solely with each person's
conscience.
There are reasons for proceeding with caution when considering
AID. A man's emotional response to knowledge of his sterility may
result in a sense of guilt over his inadequacy.28 For the husband, the
child may serve as a continual reminder of an unpleasant fact. The child
may also remind the wife that she has given birth to a stranger's child.
She may develop a sense of guilt or a longing for the donor, while the
18. Warner, supra note 13.
19. Gerstel, A Psychological View of Artificial Donor Insemination, 17 Am. J. PsYCHO-
THERAPY 64 (1963).
20. Weisman, Symposium on Artificial Insemination: The Medical Viewpoint, 7 SYRAcusE
L. REV. 96, 99 (1955).
21. Farris & Garrison, Emotional Impact of Successful Donor Insemination, A Report on
38 Couples, 3 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (1954).
22. Comment, Artificial Insemination: Confusion Compounded, 3 WAYNE L. REV. 35,
42 (1956).
23. Hassett, Freedom and Order Before God: A Catholic View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170
(1956).
24. Rackman, Morality in Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish View, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav.
1205, 1208 (1956).
25. Noble, The Protestant Viewpoint, Symposium on Artificial Insemination, 7 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 101, 103 (1955).
26. Bohn, Artificial Insemination: Psychologic and Psychiatric Evaluation, 34 U. Det.
LJ. 397, 400 (1957).
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husband may harbor a corresponding jealousy of the donor.27 Further
problems may be occasioned as the child's personality develops. The
husband may place the blame on the wife or the wife may claim exclusive
credit for particular aspects of the child's personality or behavior. If the
child's behavior leads to a family crisis, his status may be revealed through
an emotional outburst. One practitioner reported two instances of acute
pregnancy psychoses necessitating hospitalization and four instances of
disturbed patients requiring ambulatory psychotherapy as a result of AI,
but this was among 340 women he successfully artificially inseminated.28
The potential psychological problems for the AID child are due to
the possibility that he may discover his status. The resultant harm to the
child could be severe. If the child had doubts about his parentage, the
couple would be unable honestly to allay those fears, and the child would
probably develop a feeling of insecurity. Finally, if AID had any adverse
effect upon the relationship between the couple, the child's welfare corre-
spondingly would be jeopardized. However, the child does have the ad-
vantage, in contrast to many other children, of being a wanted child."
Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the child does not, in fact,
become a loved member of the family."0
Neither of the conflicting views has been factually verified, but since
AID is being practiced, the lack of evidence of psychologically bad results
tends to confirm the belief that AID is not psychologically harmful. It
is advisable that every couple contemplating AID be fully informed by
competent counselors. AID is unlikely to cure emotional ills and is prob-
ably appropriate only when the marital relationship is stable enough to
withstand the stresses which the AID child may cause. However, the
affirmative arguments that marriages with children seem to be more stable
than childless marriages, that there is a basic need of women to bear
children and that AID is successful in satisfying these needs,3 ' are all
worthy of more than a summary dismissal.
IV. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
A vital concern of society is the integrity of the family unit. Lack of
empirical evidence makes it difficult to determine whether the practice
of AID results in a harmonious family group. However, the lack of
evidence of discord, in view of the practice to date, tends to confirm the
belief that AID does not disrupt the family.
27. Id.
28. Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15
OBSTETRICAL & GYNE:COLOGICAL SURvEY 767, 781 (1960).
29. Weisman, supra note 20, at 98.
30. Bohn, supra note 26.
31. BISHOP, ARTIFCIL Hm mAN INSEMINATION: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE (1948). See
also Weisman, supra note 20.
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The practice of AID introduces a new family relationship to our
society. The traditional father, mother and child relationship is replaced
by mother, husband, donor and child. However, when this new relation-
ship is created, generally it is concealed. Many of the functions of the
family have been undergoing change, but it has not necessarily been a
disorganizing change.32 Without attempting to predict whether AID will
be successfully integrated into the American family, it should be noted
that in other societies the reproductive function is partially outside the
family with no resultant family instability or social disorganization. 3
The possibility of a marriage between the child and another of his
biological father's children presents one of the major sociological objec-
tions to AID, but the statistical probability of such an eventuality is
probably infinitesimal. There are conditions which could raise the prob-
ability significantly in a given area, but they have not yet been shown
to exist.34 The same possibility of consanguineous marriage exists for
some adopted children, but it is not a product of the adoptive process.
Other sociological objections range from predictions that in the
1980's all children will be begotten by AI and brought up in public insti-
tutions, as in Orwell's Brave New World,"5 to that of another Third
Reich. Of course these are possibilities, but the fact remains that AI is
already a means that could easily be used to that end. While this may not
be prevented from occurring in other countries, the professional responsi-
bility currently employed by American doctors tends toward responsible
use of AL.
The concealment of the AID child's biological father poses diverse
problems. Immediately apparent is the deception of the child. It is pos-
sible that children seldom rely upon the genetic characteristics of their
parents in any specific sense, but the problem could become acute if, for
example, a child believed himself to carry the genetic defect of the
husband which prompted the couple to turn to AID.
Before considering what might be done about the problem of secrecy,
it is first necessary to analyze the reasons for its maintenance. Secrecy is
seen as a vital aspect of the attempt to create, through AID, a family like
other families. Although its preservation may be a psychological burden,
full disclosure could easily defeat attainment of the desired goal. The
donor and mother might become attracted to each other and the donor
32. Mangin, Symposium on Artificial Insemination: The Sociological and Anthropological
Viewpoint, 7 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 106 (1955).
33. Id. at 108.
34. In Note, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 302, 321 (1964) it is stated that the problem could
well become acute with a limited group of donors supplying numerous specimens. However,
that assessment is also based upon the supposition that each specimen would be used for
200 inseminations. In practice, only one insemination is performed with each specimen.
35. G. ORwELL, 1984 52 (Signet ed. 1952).
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might become the object of the husband's jealousy.86 The child's loyalties
might be divided. The development of normal family relations under such
circumstances would probably be difficult. The uncertain status of AID
in contemporary culture makes the couple avoid even the limited dis-
closure that a child was conceived through AID.
The most important aspect of secrecy concerns the legal status of
the AID child. In the absence of legislation to the contrary, the child
would probably be considered illegitimate. 7 Notwithstanding the value
of AID to them, most couples are unwilling to expose their child to the
social stigma associated with illegitimacy. The couple would also desire to
avoid the social stigma associated with male sterility and to enjoy the
recognition which usually accompanies childbirth. With our present social
mores, the arguments for concealment have the greater weight, and the
dangers associated with secrecy seem too remote to justify a threat to
the welfare of the child and family.
V. EFFECT ON THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
A. Adultery
The two legal actions for terminating a marriage in Florida are
annulment and divorce. Artificial insemination might be alleged to sup-
port a ground in either proceeding. Artificial insemination might be
claimed to constitute either of two statutory grounds for divorce: adultry 8
or extreme cruelty.89 Al might also affect a third ground, the natural
impotency of a spouse.4"
There is no Florida case law on the issue of whether AID constitutes
adultery. Adultery has been held by all Florida courts to mean sexual
relations by intercourse on the part of either spouse with another man
or woman. 4 Some penetration of the female organ by the male organ has
always been required for a finding of adultery.42 If such penetration were
held to be the sole criterion, it is clear that AID could not be found to
constitute adultery. But other jurisdictions have not proceeded on such
simple reasoning. In only two cases in the United States has the question
of adultery through AID been squarely raised. Both were in the same
state, and in both cases the courts reached opposite conclusions.
In Doornbus v. Doornbus48 the court in granting a divorce held that
a child conceived by AID with the husband's consent was illegitimate,
36. Bohn, supra note 26.
37. See p. 962 infra.
38. FLA. STAT. 1 65.04(3) (1967).
39. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(4) (1967).
40. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(2) (1967).
41. FLORIDA BAR ASS'N, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 21.8 (1967).
42. 24 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 24 (1966).
43. 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County, December 13, 1954).
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that the husband was not entitled to any visitation rights, and that the
wife was guilty of adultery despite the husband's condonation of the
wife's action. However, in Hock v. Hock" the court held that AID with-
out the husband's consent was not adultery constituting grounds for
divorce because, while there was no consent, there was also no sexual
intercourse.
In a recent case, the California Supreme Court, in deciding the
question of the husband's duty of support of a child conceived by AID,
stated:
In the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial insemination,
the offspring of defendant's valid marriage to the child's mother
was lawfully begotten and was not the product of an illicit or
adulterous relationship.4
A Canadian court in the case of Orford v. Orford,46 finding AI
without the husband's consent to constitute adultery, stated that impreg-
nation per se is the test of adultery and that sexual union of the bodies
or moral turpitude is of no consequence. The court said in dictum:
[T]he essence of the offense of adultery consists, not in the
moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the
voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive
powers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission
of those powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other
than the husband or the wife comes within the definition of
'adultery.'4 7
This definition of adultery is completely at variance with the well recog-
nized common law and statutory definitions which require physical con-
nection. If the Orford test were used to determine adultery, a married
woman could swallow a contraceptive pill, have complete sexual inter-
course with a man other than her husband, and no adultery would be
committed. Such a conclusion is absurd.
In Europe, the Civil Court of Rome held that AID constituted
adultery.4 In MacLennan v. MacLennan" the Court of Session in Scot-
land held squarely to the contrary, that AID is not adultery and that no
divorce can be granted solely upon that basis. In the Scottish case Lord
Wheatley cautioned that while unconsciously being influenced by our
moral and ethical standard,
this problem ... must be decided by the objective standard of
44. Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, IlH. (1948); see Chicago Sun, Feb. 10, 1945,
at 13, col. 3; TMsE, Feb. 26, 1945, at 58.
45. People v. Sorensen, - Cal. 2d -, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
46. 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L. R. 251 (1921).
47. Id. at 22.
48. Hahlo, Some Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 74 S. ARI'cA L.J. 167 (1957).
49. (1958] Sess. Cas. 105, (Scot.), 1958 Scots L.T.R. 12.
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legal principles as these have been developed and must be con-
fined to the narrow issue of whether this form of insemination
constitutes adultery in the eyes of the law. . .. "
The idea that a woman is committing adultery when alone
in the privacy of her bedroom she injects into her ovum by
means of a syringe the seed of a man she does not know and
has never seen is one which I am afraid I cannot accept."'
These cases illustrate the dilemma that will face a trial judge in
Florida if AID is alleged as adultery or as a defense thereto. Not one of
the confusing welter of decisions is a judgment by a court of final juris-
diction. It seems clear that no one could contend that AIH is adultery.
Realistically, existing definitions of adultery, formulated long before
artificial insemination became a problem, should be legislatively redefined
in the light of changed circumstances.
There are possible defenses to alleged adultery through AID. Con-
sent to the AID could constitute the affirmative defense of connivance. 52
Adultery on the part of the wife does not constitute a ground for divorce
by the husband where the adultery is forced upon her or the husband's
conduct conduced to or aided in it." Also, there is a possible defense of
condonation or an intentional forgiveness of the matrimonial offense.14
With or without the husband's consent, AID should not constitute
adultery. Lord Wheatley's reasoning in MacLennan v. MacLennan is
logical and follows the modern definition of adultery.55 With AID there
can be no destruction of faith in the chastity or loyalty of one's spouse
since there has been no act of sexual intercourse to destroy her chastity.
There is no other man or woman with whom a spouse has consorted. There
is no sexual pleasure with someone other than the other spouse, for
there is no coitus. In fact, the donor's identity generally is not even known.
B. Extreme Cruelty
If a wife were artificially inseminated without her husband's actual
consent, the result might be sufficient for divorce on the ground of
extreme cruelty.56 Extreme cruelty consists of mental as well as physical
elements. The conduct required for this ground must depend on the facts
of a case and whether the conduct results in the infliction of pain and
50. Id. at 108.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Ci. Oyama v. Oyama, 138 Fla. 422, 189 So. 418 (1939).
53. McMillan v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935).
54. Kollar v. Kollar, 155 Fla. 705, 21 So.2d 356 (1945).
55. Ermis v. Ermis, 255 Wis. 339, 38 N.W.2d 485 (1949). Adultery is the voluntary
sexual intercourse of a married man or woman with a person other than the offender's wife
or husband. Penetration by the man of the woman is necessary to prove adultery. Dennis v.
Dennis, 2 All E.R. 51 (1955); 24 A.. JuiR. Divorce and Separation § 24 (1966).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 65.04(4) (1967).
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suffering on the spouse. 7 The husband would have to show that the wife's
conduct over a period of time caused him great mental pain and anguish,
affected his health seriously, and made further cohabitation an intolerable
and unbearable burden."8 The birth of a child through AID may create
in the husband strong feelings of inferiority, and these feelings may be
accentuated as his wife fulfills her reproductive function. If the husband
has not consented to AID59 feelings of impotence and inferiority may be
aggravated. Because he has had no knowledge or control over the con-
ception of the child, he may feel that the child is not his own and that
his wife has violated her marriage vows. Doctors, perhaps to avoid this,
generally require the parties to sign a form to consent to AID."
C. Impotency
The term "naturally impotent," as either a statutory ground for
divorce in Florida6 or for annulment, 62 means a lack of capacity to
copulate existing at the time of the marriage. 3 Regardless of how the
condition arose, it must be incurable. 4 A spouse's impotency must not
be known to the other spouse at the time of the marriage.65 Because
annulment is possible where the marriage was never consummated by
normal sexual intercourse, a major question raised by AIH is presented:
Is AIH a consummation of marriage which will bar an action for divorce
or annulment by the wife on grounds of the husband's impotency? An
English court has answered in the negative, holding that "the conception
of the child . . . when done with the dominant intention of producing
normality in their sex relations [was not] approbation of an abnormal
marriage."66 In that case the annulment was granted to the wife even
though the child was made illegitimate. A statute enacted a few months
later avoided this harsh result by providing that any child who would
have been legitimate if his parents' marriage were dissolved by divorce
"shall be legitimate even though the marriage is voidable and annulled." 67
In 1953 an English court held that an unsuccessful AID attempt
does not waive a wife's right to annulment on the ground of non-consum-
57. Lyon v. Lyon, 54 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1951).
58. Kellogg v. Kellogg, 93 Fla. 261, 111 So. 637 (1927).
59. The physician generally requires the parties to sign a form to consent to AID. An
example of this form is shown in FLORIDA BAR ASS'N, FLORIDA FAMmY LAW '§ 3.62 (1967).
60. The question of consent is also of extreme importance in determining the legal
rights of the child and the duties owed to him. See p. 962 infra.
61. FLA. STAT. 1§ 65.04(2) (1967).
62. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(2) (1967) ; Cott v. Cott, 98 So.2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).




66. L. v. L., 1 All E.R. 141, 145 (1949).
67. 14 Geo. VI c. 25, '1 9 (1950). See also In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So.2d
840 (1947).
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mation of the marriage.6 8 A New York court in 1963 reached a similar
conclusion in a case which involved AID done with the husband's consent,
based on the fact that the marriage had not been consummated, even
though the AID was successful. 9
VI. LEGAL STATUS AND RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
A. Legal Status of the Child
A child produced by AID has been held to be illegitimate in every
reported case in the United States in which the issue has been squarely
presented. However, in other cases the AID child has been treated as
if he were legitimate, in order to determine his rights or the obligations
owed to him. Florida has no case law on the status of the AID child.
In Strnad v. Strnad0 the court, in deciding a motion to fix the extent
of a separated husband's right to visit the child who was in the mother's
custody, held that the husband was not deprived of the parental visitation
right by the fact that the child was the offspring of an AID consented to
by the husband. The court held that the child was legitimate for the
reason "that the child has been potentially adopted or semi-adopted by
the defendant.'
Ten years after the Strnad case, the same court used an indirect
approach to prevent a child conceived by AID from being declared
illegitimate:
[T]o stigmatize them as children of an unknown father by
means of artificial insemination of the mother is no more, in my
view, than an attempt to make these innocents out as children
of bastardy. And where a parent attempts such means, the law
will still the lips of such a parent. This I believe will be done
even where artificial insemination is lawful, for, on the last turn,
it is the children who, when so revealed, must go through life in
such obfuscation. 2
The effect of this case was to estop the parent from testifying as to the
fact of AID if it would not inure to the benefit of the child.
In 1963, the same court as that in the two foregoing cases handed
down the decision of Gursky v. Gursky.78 Following common law prin-
ciples and their current statutory enactments, the court came to a de-
cision which was well reasoned, though perhaps shocking and displeasing
68. Slater v. Slater, 1 All E.R. 246 (1953).
69. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
70. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
71. Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
72. People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 264, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
73. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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to some.74 The question before the court was whether a child conceived
by AID with the husband's consent is legitimate as to the husband and,
if not, whether there is a duty on any other ground to support the child.
On the first issue, the court held that a child conceived by AID, even
with the husband's consent, is not the legitimate issue of the husband.
On the second issue the court found a duty of support.
One author 75 states that the court in Gursky v. Gursky7 failed to
follow the example set by Anonymous v. Anonymous" of subordinating
technical considerations to a concern for the welfare of the child. Another
author states that the court in Gursky should have followed the decision
in the Strnad case :78
It did not place enough emphasis on the fact that artificial in-
semination was not contemplated when the common law rule
was established nor when the New York Legislature passed the
statute relied upon by the Court. The Court could have taken
into consideration the fact that AI is a new scientific advance-
ment in the field of medicine and could have given the policy
of legitimacy a more liberal interpretation.79
The language of the Family Court Act of New York, which defined
an illegitimate child as one born "out of wedlock," was interpreted to
mean a child whose "father" is not its mother's husband.'0 Neither the
statute nor New York case law defines "father." To reason that the hus-
band of a woman who, with his consent, conceives artificially is the
child's "father" and that the child is therefore born "in wedlock" would
not require a distortion of the statutory language. In fact, such an inter-
pretation would best achieve the court's avowed purpose of reaching a
result least harmful to the child. This interpretation was used in People
v. Sorensen,8 where the court held that the term "father" cannot be
limited to the natural father but depends on the actual legal relationship
of father and child.
Sorensen was also a typical example of a court avoiding the legit-
imacy issue except to find the AID child legitimate for a specific purpose
consistent with California public policy.
In California, legitimacy is a legal status that may exist despite
74. There has been a tremendous number of articles written on the Gursky case, and
almost all are critical of the decision. See, e.g., Note, 64 CoLuM. L.R. 376 (1964); Note,
1964 DUKE L.J. 163 (1964).
75. 1964 DUxE L.J. 163 (1964).
76. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
77. 208 Misc. 633, 143 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
78. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
79. 3 J. FAmLY L. 365 (1963).
80. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare v. Koehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 264, 30 N.E.2d 587, 589,
20 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1940).
81. - Cal. 2d -, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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the fact that the husband is not the natural father of the child.
. . . [S]ince the subject of legitimation as well as that of suc-
cession of property is properly one for legislative action . . . .
we are not required in this case to do more than decide that,
within [the California criminal non-support of a child statute
the husband] is the lawful father of the child conceived through
heterologous artificial insemination and born during his marriage
to the child's mother.82
A child's interest could be protected at the evidentiary level. The pre-
sumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate is universally
recognized and is one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known
in law. 3 Some states create this presumption by statute, but it is clear
that the presumption exists independently of statute in practically all
jurisdictions including Florida. 4 A husband can contest the legitimacy
of a child born in wedlock, but the wife does not have this right.8 5 The
natural parent argument has been advanced to attack the application of
this presumption to the AID child. This argument is that the wedlock
or the marriage to legitimize the child would have to be between the
mother and the biological father. A Florida statute provides that "if the
mother of any bastard child and the reputed father shall at any time after
its birth intermarry, the child shall in all respects be deemed and held
legitimate .. ". ."I" It does not seem necessary to construe the word
"reputed" any way other than as it is normally defined to avoid the
establishment of the biological father.8 7 It might, however, be necessary
to estop a parent from testifying as to AID, as was done in a New York
case, 88 or to hold as an Illinois case did that some evidence of artificial
conception of a child was not sufficient to overcome the strong presump-
tion of legitimacy.89
Florida is one of the more liberal states in protecting its children.
In a recent Florida case the "best interests of the child" doctrine was
used to override the statutory necessity of consent from the State Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, which was guardian of a child, so that the foster
parents could adopt the child.90 The court stated that "the paramount
issue before this court is the best interests of the child .... 91
Because of the strong presumption favoring legitimacy, the use of
a mixture of the husband and donor's semen or combined artificial
82. Id. at -, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
83. 10 Am. JR. 2D Bastards § 10 (1963).
84. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944).
85. Id.
86. FLA. STAT. § 742.091 (1967) (emphasis added).
87. "Reputed" is defined as "according to reputation or popular belief." WEBSTER's NEW
COLLGiATE DICTiOwARY 729 (7th ed. 1963).
88. People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
89. Ohlson v. Ohlson (Unreported, Super. Ct. Cook County, Ila., Nov., 1954).
90. In re Alexander, 206 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1968).
91. Id. at 453.
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insemination (CAI) would probably prevent illegitimacy of the child.
It seems doubtful that the presumption could be overcome by merely
proving that the husband has a low fertility potential, since this only
shows it was unlikely that the hubsand was the natural father, not that it
was impossible for him to father the child. There is no medical advantage
gained by CAI, other than to help the husband psychologically. The
problem with using CAI, however, is that the antibodies in the husband's
semen may make the attempted fertilization ineffectual.92
It is clear that a child conceived through AIH is the legitimate issue
of the husband and the mother. If it were to be decided in Florida that
the AID child is illegitimate then the many problems that are connected
with that status arise.
B. Inheritance Rights
In Florida, an illegitimate child is entitled to inherit from his mother,
but not from his mother's husband.93 Where the husband leaves a will
and names the beneficiary, no problem arises. However, if a testator
leaves property to the husband's "child" or "issue," and these words are
used in their judicially interpreted sense, an illegitimate child may be
incapable of taking under the will. A bequest to "children" or "issue"
excludes illegitimates unless a contrary intention can be ascertained."
Thus, it appears that the question of consent to AID would be of extreme
importance in determining the validity of the child's claim under the
will, should AID children be held illegitimate. Where the husband con-
sented to the AID or subsequently condoned it, it seems that the court
should find that the husband intended to provide for the child by his
will. Additionally, the consent of the husband to AID might constitute
an acknowledgement of himself as the father of the child which would
allow inheritance under a Florida statute."' The language of the statute
does not appear to preclude this desirable result.96
The advantage of secrecy as to the identity of the donor has already
been discussed.97 In practice it would also prevent the AID child from
asserting any inheritance rights against the donor. In Florida, the nat-
ural parents of an adopted child cannot inherit from the adopted child.9 8
92. Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15
OBsTnamcAL & GYNEcoLOoIcAL SuRvEY 767, 773 (1960).
93. FLA. STAT. 1 731.29 (1967).
94. With the exception of statutory provisions to the contrary, an adopted child is an
heir at law. FLA. STAT. § 731.30 (1967). A putative father can acknowledge his child. FLA.
STAT. § 731.29(1) (1967), and the child becomes legitimate if his parents intermarry. FLA.
STAT. § 742.091 (1967).
95. FLA. STAT. 1 731.29 (1967)
96. Id.: "Every illegitimate child is an heir of his mother, and also of the person who,
in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the
father." (Emphasis added.)
97. See p. 957 supra.
98. FIA. STAT. § 731.30 (1967).
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By analogy, if the AID child was treated by the courts in the same
manner, the donor would not be allowed to inherit from the child.
An effective method for allowing the AID child to inherit from the
husband would be for the husband to legally adopt the child. 9 However,
the undesirable notoriety and other reasons for the reluctance of people
to use this device has already been discussed."° The hubsand might
refuse adoption after consenting to AID, or he might die before the child's
birth or before the adoption is completed. Finally, adoption is a legal
formality which, as a practical matter, would rarely be used by a husband
who has not even drawn a will.
C. Child Support
A second problem, if the child is found to be illegitimate, is whether
the husband or donor can be forced to support a child conceived by AID.
As a general rule, a husband is not liable to support a child born to his
wife but not procreated by him. 1' 1 The Florida statute dealing with
failure to support refers to any person who deprives his child of necessary
sustenance or raiment.'02
In Florida, the putative father has a legal liability to support a
child procreated by him.'03 Failure to do so can result in severe penal-
ties.104 The donor of an AID child might be saved from prosecution by
the secrecy involved because there would have to be a judicial determina-
tion in Florida that the alleged father (donor) was, in fact, the father of
the child.' Since there is no case law on the rights or obligations, if any,
of the donor they should be defined by legislation. It has been recom-
mended that a standard form of release could relieve the donor of all
obligations as a putative father. 0 6
Notwithstanding the statutes and the general rule, courts which
hold that an AID child is illegitimate might find another basis for the
husband's duty of support where he has given consent. In Gursky v.
Gursky the court was able to find a contract implied in fact.0 7 The same
cases hold that the wife's reliance and action on the husband's implied
promise that the child would be part of the husband's family and be
supported by him would estop him from refusing such support.
99. Id.
100. See p. 954 supra.
101. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 583, 584 (1950).
102. FLA. STAT. § 828.04 (1967) (emphasis added).
103. Clements v. Banks, 159 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
104. FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1967).
105. Clark v. Blackburn, 151 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1963).
106. FLORMA BAR Ass'Ni, FLORIDA FAmrr.vy LAW § 3.64 (1967). However, if a court
found that the donor had an obligation to the child, the release might be against public
policy even where the mother brings the action.
107. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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The husband might also be compelled to support the child by virtue
of his standing in loco parentis to it.10 A person who receives a child into
his family under circumstances which create a presumption that he in-
tends to assume liability for support must fulfill those duties.109
In People v. Sorensen,"0 the Supreme Court of California established
the husband's duty of support in the first criminal prosecution involving
AID. The court stated that:
[T]he term "father" . . . cannot be limited to the biologic
father or natural father as those terms are generally understood.
The determinative factor is whether the legal relationship of
father and child exists....
[I]t is safe to assume that without defendant's active
participation and consent the child would not have been pro-
created."'
The indication from the majority of decisions to date is that with-
out the husband's consent to AID, he has no duty of support to the
resulting child." 2
D. Visitation Privilege
If the husband of a mother who conceives a child by AID has
the support obligations of a natural father, he should also have the cor-
responding privileges. Where the husband is the non-custodial parent,
his right to visit the child should be determined under the same guide-
lines as a natural father.
In the much-quoted decision of Strnad v. Strnad,"' the court decid-
ed a motion to fix the extent of the separated husband's right to visit
the child who was in the mother's custody. The court held that the
defendant-husband was a fit visitor for the child, and stated that he
was not deprived of parental visitation rights by the fact that the child
was the offspring of an AID consented to by the husband.
E. Conclusion
The common law concept of illegitimacy was grounded in moral
considerations of adultery and pre-marital sexual relations when the
practice of AID was not contemplated. If the courts broaden this original
concept of illegitimacy to fit artificial insemination cases, they will be
pursuing a totally unrealistic approach to the practicalities of law and
108. See Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 583, 586 (1950).
109. Comment, Custody of Children in Artificial Insemination Cases, 15 Mo. L. Rav.
153, 159 (1950).
110. - Cal. 2d -, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
111. Id. at -, 437 P.2d 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
112. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
113. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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the exigencies of sound social policy. This author feels that Gursky v.
Gursky" 4 is a mandate to the legislature to act to determine the legit-
imacy of these children.
VII. OTHER POSSIBLE LEGAL PROBLEMS
While it is unlikely that prosecution for the following offenses would
result, it is nevertheless a possibility under Florida law. The possibility
is more remote for some offenses than others.
A. Forgery
Where the husband's name is listed on the birth certificate as the
father, by a person who knows the child was conceived by AID, the
crime of uttering a forged instrument has been committed. By statute,
whoever utters and publishes as true a false record, knowing it to be
false, with the intent to defraud any person, is subject to fine or im-
prisonment or both.11 5 Doctors can probably avoid forgery charges by
having one doctor perform the insemination and having another, with-
out knowledge of how the child was conceived, deliver the child.
B. Criminal Adultery
Adultery may constitute a crime, but in Florida the crime requires
living in open adultery." 6 This requirement alone should rule out AID
as a method of perpetrating the crime. The state has the burden of
showing that the parties (mother and donor) lived together openly as if
the relations of husband and wife existed and a mere occasional illicit
intercourse is not sufficient."
7
C. Doctor and Donor's Liability
A doctor is of course liable for ordinary negligence."" If an abnormal
child resulted from AID it would probably be impossible to ascribe
negligence because proof of causation would be virtually impossible due
to genetic uncertainties. Nevertheless, most doctors insist that the hus-
band and wife release him from any responsibility in the event of ab-
normal issue. This is one provision in the typical consent form." 9 If a
doctor administered AID without the consent of the woman, the un-
privileged touching could constitute a battery. 20 Adultery has previously
been discussed, but those who contend that the doctor or donor could be
114. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
115. FLA. STAT. § 831.02 (1967).
116. FLA. STAT. '§ 798.01 (1967).
117. Watson v. State, 142 Fla. 218, 194 So. 640 (1940).
118. Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
119. FLoIDA BAR ASS'N, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 3.62 (1967).
120. 6 AM. JuR. Assault & Battery § 5 (1963).
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guilty of adultery should note the absurdities involved when the doctor
is a woman or the donor has died before the wife is impregnated with
his seed. The donor, if he was not protected by the concealment of his
identity, might be made to pay hospital and medical expenses incidental
to the birth of the child. 2 '
VIII. A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
A. What is Necessary?
Notwithstanding the fact that society has a positive interest in find-
ing children legitimate, and that the practice of AID does not have the
evils normally associated with the conception of offspring who are not
the natural children of their mother's husband, it seems unlikely that
the courts, bound by a rigid definitional approach, will consistently
classify the AID child as legitimate.
There are three approaches that may be taken. One is to remain
passive and let the courts handle the situation. Another is to enact legisla-
tion prohibiting the practice of AID. The third is to enact legislation
regulating AID as a legal practice and declaring the resulting children
legitimate or illegitimate.
To remain passive is to let a confused situation continue and possibly
worsen. Litigation will increase as more AID children are born, grow
older, and as their parents die. With the increased litigation, judicial
conflict will grow and policy will become more obscure. It is more con-
structive to solve this problem by enacting legislation applying to AID
than by forcing the courts to solve the problems by interpreting statutes
which were never meant to deal with it. A failure to legislate would
amount to an abnegation of the policy-making function for which the
legislature is uniquely qualified. Public policy on important and con-
troverted issues should be legislatively declared so that individuals can
conduct their lives accordingly, avoiding needless hardships.
One author has recommended that AID should be made a criminal
offense on the part of the doctor, other implementing intermediary, and
the donor. It would appear that he approached the problem with less
than a completely objective view. 22 The practice of AID should be
voluntary and governed by individual choice. Therefore, no prohibitive
legislation should be enacted to facilitate enforcement of any particular
group's opposition to the free choice of any individual, where the activity
does not harm the general health and morals of society.
Another complication of a statute prohibiting AID is the possibility
121. De Moya v. de Pena, 148 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
122. Rice, AID-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NoTmz DAmB LAW. 510 (1959). See note 23
supra and accompanying text.
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that child-bearing is a right protected by the fourteenth amendment.a
This argument could certainly be advanced to attack the statute as an
unreasonable exercise of police power. Public morals legislation must
show a reasonable connection between the regulation and the activity
affecting public morality. 124 A prohibitive statute might not be reason-
ably connected to an activity that affects public morals. Additionally,
legal authority declaring AID as adultery would appear to be in deroga-
tion of the common law requirement of penetration.
The most constructive remedy to the problem is to enact a legitima-
tion statute framed in general terms. Oklahoma State Representative
George Camp 125 proposed the first successful artificial insemination
statute which the enlightened legislature of Oklahoma adopted in 1967.126
Today Oklahoma is the only state to have enacted a legitimation
statute for the AID child. 127 Other states have attempted to enact legit-
imation statutes, but the last attempt'1 28 was sixteen years prior to the
successful Oklahoma statute, and the scope of the problem has since
greatly increased.
If legislation is enacted, a choice has to be made between compre-
hensive or general legislation. One author favors comprehensive legisla-
tion, covering each phase of the process from the donation of the sperm
to the birth of the child. 29 He has also drafted an excellent example of
comprehensive legislation. 180 The comprehensive legislation would have
a state agency handle the policy decisions now being made by individual
doctors, and a centralized recording facility would be maintained. This
approach, however, would be disproportionate to the size of the problem.
It would create more problems than it would solve. Deviations from the
statutory norm would require sanctions and a problem of enforcement
would then arise.
A general statute appears to be the most desirable alternative. While
reflecting a policy of freedom of choice along with the protection of the
child's welfare it should declare AID to be a lawful therapeutic practice,
123. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) which held that the right of
privacy in marital relations is a fundamental right which is protected by the fourteenth
amendment from infringement by the states. Cf. Cotner v. Henry, No. 16601 (7th Cir.,
April 17, 1968).
124. Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (1938).
125. The author is grateful to Representative Camp for the information he furnished
for preparation of this paper.
126. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 551 (1967).
127. New York City Health Code art. 21 (1959) regulates AID, in that donors are
required to undergo medical examination. The act was the result of New York doctors
receiving advertisements offering semen from professional donors. As a result of recent
decisions, New York City is in the unique position of legislating illegitimate children.
128. New York S.B. No. 493 (1951).
129. Comment, Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child?, 9 VILLANOVA L.
REv. 77 (1963).
130. Id. at 90. A "Model Artificial Insemination Statute" appears in the appendix.
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define the general procedures, establish the participation of the wife,
husband, and donor as lawful and declare that the child shall be legit-
imate. The specific procedures of AID, with minimum essential excep-
tions, should be left entirely to the responsibility of the medical pro-
fession. Suggestions for the protection of the medical profession include
comprehensive legislation which would reveal the identity of the donor.' 31
However, the psychological and sociological implication discussed earlier
would not seem to justify this.
B. Proposed Florida Statute
The author has drafted the following general artificial insemination
statute and submits that it should be adopted in Florida. Although similar
to the Oklahoma statute, it has been modified for additional protection.
A Bill to be Entitled
AN ACT relating to children; providing for legitimacy of
children born through heterologous artificial insemination; pro-
viding that such children shall be considered as natural born
children of husband and wife agreeing in writing to such
process; providing for physicians' certification of the donor;
providing for privacy; providing a penalty; providing an
effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. The technique of heterologous artificial insemina-
tion may be performed in this State by persons duly authorized
to practice medicine at the request and with the consent in
writing of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such
technique for the purpose of conceiving a child or children.
Section 2. Any child born as the result thereof shall be con-
sidered legitimate for all purposes and in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and
wife so requesting and consenting to the use of such a technique.
Section 3. No person shall perform the technique of heterol-
ogous artificial insemination unless currently licensed to practice
medicine in this State, and then only at the request and with
the written consent of the husband and wife desiring the utiliza-
tion of such technique. The said consent shall be executed and
acknowledged by the husband and wife, the person who is to
perform the technique and the judge having jurisdiction over
adoption of children in the county in which the technique is to
be performed. An original thereof shall be filed under the same
rules as adoption papers. The written consent so filed shall not
be open to inspection nor a certified copy given to any person
131. See Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal Aspects, 43
A.BA.J. 1089, 1090 (1957).
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other than the person executing such consent, or to persons
having a legitimate interest therein as evidenced by a specific
court order.
Section 4. The physician performing the heterologous arti-
ficial insemination shall select the donor and certify that the
donor has the same general physical characteristics as the hus-
band, a compatible Rh factor and is free from communicable
and inheritable diseases. The certification shall be executed by
the physician and acknowledged by the judge having jurisdic-
tion over adoption of children. An original of the certification
shall be filed in the same manner as the consent of the husband
and wife and shall not be open to inspection to any person
other than the husband or wife or to persons having a legitimate
interest therein as evidenced by a specific court order. The phy-
sician shall not reveal the identity of the donor.
Section 5. Any employee of the State or the physician or the
physician's employees who shall make public any information
in violation of the privacy provisions of section 3 or section 4
of this chapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned not more than
ninety (90) days in the county jail or both.
Section 6. This act shall take effect upon becoming law.
